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Rude: The New U.S. Maritime Strategy Surfaces

THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY SURFACES

Lu Rude

In order to cope with threats and safeguard U.S. interests, the new U.S.
maritime strategy puts forward six major missions for sea power: deploy
decisive sea power in a forward position in limited conf licts of regional
scale; deter war between major powers; win wars for the nation; safeguard
homeland security from long-distance; promote and maintain cooperative
relationships with more international partners; and prevent or eliminate
regional destruction before it affects the international system. To accomplish these six missions, U.S. sea power must possess the corresponding six
core capabilities, including the capability to be in a forward position (present global deployment), deterrence capability, sea control capability, force
projection capability, the capability to safeguard public order at sea, and
humanitarian assistance and disaster response capability.
SPECIAL TEXT FOR THIS PAGE
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the latest put forward by
the United States, represents the first major revision of [U.S.] maritime
strategy in twenty years. The 1986 Maritime Strategy was essentially a Cold
War era strategy with “war as the nucleus,” mainly for establishing sea
supremacy. The objective was global confrontation with the Soviet Navy.
Obviously, with the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the Soviet Navy’s decline, the “1986 edition” of the U.S. maritime strategy was already obsolete.
Faced with the new international situation of counterterrorism following
the “9/11” incident and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the
rapid rise of developing nations and the formation of a multipolar world,
[and] as a result of over two years of debate and discussion by the U.S.
Navy’s theoretical circle, the “2007 edition” of the maritime strategy, which
brandishes the great banner of “international cooperation” and a plausible
new face, was finally issued.
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is composed of six sections: introduction, challenges for the new era, maritime strategic concepts,
strategic implementation, tasks prioritized for implementation, and conclusion. This essay gives a brief analysis to offer insights into the new trends
of the U.S. Navy.
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A DUALITY OF THE ANGLE OF VIEW: PREVENTING AND WINNING
WAR ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT
In the introduction to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, there
is a conspicuous new viewpoint: it is written unequivocally that “Preventing
and Winning War Are Equally Important.” In the past, the U.S. Navy’s strategy
emphasized “gain the initiative by striking first” and “win by war,” and it was all
about warfare preparations and operations planning. The new strategy believes
that “maritime power should both be devoted to winning wars decisively, and
to increasing war prevention capability,” thus attaching importance to containing war before it occurs. Elevating war prevention to the same strategic status of
importance as winning war in military theory represents a major change in the
U.S. naval strategy. This is a reaffirmation of the internationally and universally
recognized “maritime military operations other than war.” It can be foreseen
that henceforth the international cooperation and noncombat use of navies will
increase. This will become a new common bright point for activities at sea by
the world’s navies.
AN ENTIRELY NEW WAY OF THINKING: MARITIME INTERESTS CANNOT BE DICTATED BY ONE COUNTRY
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower describes the current and future threats facing the United States as “the continuous increase of transnational
actors, rogue states, proliferation of weapon technologies and information, and
natural disasters.” “The vast majority of the world’s population lives within several hundred kilometers from the sea. This necessitates an entirely new way of
thinking about the role of maritime power.” Following the implementation of
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, world oceanic trends have experienced a great change, and the oceans have become a new domain for rivalry. The
United States recognized that “no one country alone has sufficient resources to
guarantee the security of the entire maritime space.” Therefore, this strategy
“appeals to every government, non-governmental organization, international
organization and private institution to develop partnership relationships based
on common interests to address the frequently occurring new threats.”
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. strategic goals were confused for a while. Following the “9/11” incident, however, the
United States has regained its sense, “enemies can very well use unconventional
warfare to win over America’s superior military strength.” This has forced the
United States to rethink its maritime strategy and realize that the U.S. homeland
and global strategic interests were no longer threatened by a fi xed strategic opponent. Rather, the United States faces a multitude of potential threats.
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The United States is the promoter of unipolarity, all along relying on its powerful naval fleets to dominate the seas and safeguard America’s own interests.
But the tremendous change in the international system makes it begin to think
reasonably that the present maritime issues affect each nation’s interests, that no
海军是战略地区的核心力量. 美国海军继续充当美国全球战略的急先锋与主力军.
The Navy is the core force in strategic regions. The U.S. Navy continues to serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S. global strategy.
one country can dominate, and that all forces must be mobilized in the world to
jointly safeguard the “common interests” at sea. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower clearly proposes that “collective security activities will be conducted to address common threats and assemble common interests in an open
and multipolar world, and maritime power will be used to build confidence
and mutual trust among nations.” It is important to note that this is the first
time that U.S. official writings have put forward [the concept of] a transition
to multipolarity and the construction of “cooperative partnerships” based on
maritime common interests.
In the section on strategy implementation, the new maritime strategy has
clear differences from the “1986 edition,” placing the utmost emphasis on “war
prevention through cooperation in each region, and not waiting for war to break
out to win it. Particularly when confronting the threat of terrorism, we must use
forward deployed forces to stop terrorism as far away from the U.S. coastline as
possible, thus guaranteeing the absolute security of the U.S. homeland.”
One can see that the new U.S. maritime strategy emphasizes “military software” such as “humanitarian rescue missions and improving cooperative relations between the United States and every country,” thus attempting to achieve
the goals of preventing war and maintaining peace. If it can be achieved, this is
a rational choice suitable for the present international circumstances. All countries have a great need to explore the new thinking of developing mutual assistance and common prosperity to remove divergences and jointly safeguard the
peace of the oceans. This is also the international obligation of “peaceful use of
the oceans” and “joint management of the oceans” advocated in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
This could be a major change in the U.S. military’s maritime strategy. It must
receive the affirmation of all the world’s nations.
STRATEGIC FOCUS: SHIFT FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE PACIFIC
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states: from now on, U.S. military strength will be concentrated in “areas where tension escalates, or in regions in which we hope to demonstrate to friendly nations and allies the U.S.
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resolve to maintain stability, and regions where the U.S. realizes its obligations to its allies.” “The U.S. will continue to deploy strong operational
power in the Western Pacific, and the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean,
to safeguard U.S. and allied interests and to deter potential competitors.”
In fact, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy declared: the new strategy “not only
discusses things that we want to do, we have already begun to do some of
these things,” such as having already deployed forces in these two regions
of strategic importance.
The Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea are the “energy lifelines,”
and they constitute a strategic thoroughfare that America’s global strategy must guarantee. The Middle East is a “powder keg,” and these seas
were the maritime battlegrounds of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraq “War to
Overthrow Saddam” and the Afghan War. Moreover, these are regions in
which several countries possess nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear
proliferation exists. By setting up pointed defenses and carrying out
strategic deployment, the United States is prepared to act at any time and to
intervene.
The Western Pacific is the area of most intense competition among nations for maritime sovereignty. It is also a region that has the highest concentration and fastest growth in terms of the world’s naval forces. Some
Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and possess nuclear weapons or the capability to develop them; they will directly inf luence and challenge American hegemony.
Moreover, Asia is the region in which the United States has concluded and
signed the highest number of defense treaties, an important sea area in
which the United States has implemented island chain defense. Therefore,
according to the new U.S. strategy, the Western Pacific is determined to
be “a region of high tension” where the United States has the responsibility to “carry out treaty obligations” to its allies and to “contain potential
strategic competitors.”
Consequently, the United States not only increases its military strength on
the Japanese mainland and in the Ryukyu Islands, it also dispatches carrier
battle groups to cruise around in a heightened state of war readiness. For “humanitarian objectives” and “the requirements of international cooperation,”
the Western Pacific is the sea area where the U.S. military conducts the largest
and most frequent maritime exercises with its allies. Such frequent transnational and multinational maritime military exercises were not possible more
than a decade ago, and this is the evidence that the new U.S. maritime strategy
has already been put into effect.
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FORWARD DEPLOYMENT: STRATEGY TO DOMINATE THE OCEAN
CAN BE TRACED TO THE SAME ORIGIN
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower believes: major changes have
taken place in the global strategic environment, and the United States faces
threats dispersed all over the world. Therefore, it is necessary to give full play
to the “expeditionary” and “multi-role” characteristics of sea power, and adopt
globally “dispersed deployment to defend the homeland and U.S. citizens, and
promote our interests on a global scale.”
Obviously, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower has not changed
the [U.S.] strategic goal of dominating the world’s oceans. The United States still
attempts to rely on its formidable sea power to control the world’s oceans, carry
亚洲一些大国迅速崛起, 经济, 科技实力雄厚, 国家拥有核武器或具有发展核武器的能
力, 将直接影响, 挑战美国的霸权主义.
Some Asian countries are rising rapidly, have abundant economic and technological strength, and
possess nuclear weapons or the capability to develop them; they will directly influence and challenge American hegemony.
out global deployments, [and] continue to brandish military force to “deter wars
between great powers,” thus maintaining its domination of the world’s oceans.
The new maritime strategy pointedly emphasizes “forward deployment” and
seeks to implement “expeditionary” and “multi-role” [capabilities], thus striving to keep the battlefield far away from the American homeland so that U.S.
security and interests can be realized.
Over the course of the “9/11” incident and the Afghan and Iraq wars,
from international counterterrorism operations the U.S. Navy recognized
that the terror wars it confronted were completely different from traditional
wars. There was uncertainty concerning the combat opponents, the areas
of operations, the methods of engagement, and the triggering events. There
were neither clear boundary lines between countries and regions nor conventional precursors of war. The “Chief planner” of U.S. military strategy,
[former] Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Hoehn, believes: “terrorism has unprecedented destructiveness, and it travels and connects various
continents and regions. To deal with it, you must wage a global war.” As a
result, “counterterrorism” war must use the “great dragnet” of international
cooperation for global defense.
The new U.S. maritime strategic concept holds that even if a regional war
is limited, it is still very difficult to achieve complete victory without international support, so only through international cooperation can “terror
war” be prevented and peace obtained. The new strategic concept integrates
such clauses as “promoting and maintaining cooperative relations with
more international partners,” and asserts that “emphasis will be placed on
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conf lict prevention through humanitarian rescue and assistance operations
and strengthening international cooperation.” It emphasizes that preventing
war is as important as preventing war from expanding, and that preventing
war from expanding requires international cooperation, so as to avoid affecting the global system and American interests. This is a transformation
that has caught people’s attention.
In objectively analyzing the U.S. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower, one can see that the “2007 edition” of the new maritime strategy
is relatively moderate compared to the previous version in its use of words
and style. It holds high the great banner of “cooperation,” elevates preventing war to the same strategic status as winning war, and takes it as an important mission for U.S. maritime power. For the first time, it acknowledges
that the present world is “multipolar,” and believes that no country alone
is capable of safeguarding the world’s maritime areas from terrorism and
other threats. This thinking is suited to dealing concretely with world conditions. But the hegemonic U.S. thinking of dominating the world’s oceans
has not changed at all. While the new strategy has produced some rhetorical
changes, what it enumerates are essentially responses to the current global
security situation and [consequent] requirements for America’s own interests. Its emphasis on “international cooperation” and demand for “allied
participation” serve the U.S. global strategy. The people of the entire world
are glad to see this transformation in strategic thinking, [but] will wait and
see, hoping for genuine actions and practical results.
NEWS BACKGROUND
On 17 November, at the “International Seapower” Symposium held in the
U.S. state of Rhode Island, a report entitled A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower was rapidly transmitted all over the world, arousing a
high degree of attention among the world’s navies. Many articles have been
written by military-theoretical circles to interpret and comment on the report. Why did this alarm the world? First, this document was jointly signed
and issued by the three leading figures of U.S. maritime power—Chief of
Naval Operations Roughead, Marine Corps Commandant Conway, and
Coast Guard Commandant Allen—a rare occurrence. Second, at the Naval
War College’s international naval symposium in Newport, Rhode Island,
the new U.S. maritime strategy was announced in front of the heads of
navies from over one hundred nations and regions. This is the first time in
U.S. history that America’s maritime forces—the Navy, Marine Corps and
Coast Guard—jointly formulated and publicly announced a unified maritime strategy at an “international conference.”
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AUTHOR’S COMMENTARY: THE NAVY, DARING VANGUARD OF U.S.
GLOBAL STRATEGY
The conclusion of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower points out:
“this strategy focuses on opportunities—not threats; on optimism—not fear;
and on confidence—not doubt. . . . In the future, the navy will continue to unite
in executing this strategy. U.S. maritime forces will always safeguard the nation
and its major interests.” Obviously, the new U.S. maritime strategy’s issuance
demonstrates that the strategic status of U.S. maritime forces has been further
elevated. This is also the motivating reason and the result of the ability of the
three U.S. maritime forces to work together to issue the new maritime strategy.
The Navy is the core force in strategic regions. The U.S. Navy continues to
serve as the daring vanguard and main force of U.S. global strategy. The new
strategy is absolutely unequivocal: “From now on, U.S. sea power will be concentrated in areas that have heightened tension or require the United States to
fulfi ll commitments to allies. The United States will continue to deploy powerful operational forces in the Western Pacific, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian
Ocean to protect U.S. and allied interests, and contain potential competitors.”
The U.S. Navy is hoisting the banner of “humanitarian assistance operations
and strengthening international cooperation,” and continuing “forward deployment” in maritime hotspots. Wherever a crisis emerges, U.S. carrier battle
group[s] will appear there; this kind of strategic deployment cannot change.
Although A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower projects the pleasant wording of “peace,” “cooperation,” and “war prevention,” hegemonic thinking remains its main thread. For example, “we cannot permit a circumstance to
arise in which our maritime power is deprived of mobility and freedom to operate in the sea lanes. Similarly, we cannot permit any enemy to attempt to block
or disrupt major channels of maritime commerce or communication, thereby
cutting off global supply lines. In circumstances of necessity, we have the capacity to control maritime space in any region, ideally with partners or allies
participating, but alone when necessary.” Clearly, what is behind “cooperation”
is America’s interests, having “partners or the participation of allies” likewise
serves America’s global interests.
Strengthening “dynamic deployment.” As a result of the current uncertainty
concerning maritime crises, the “static deployment mode” of large, fi xed military bases is already unsuited to the requirements of the “war against terror.” The
U.S. Navy’s overseas bases are decreasing in number, and it is shifting toward a
“dynamic projection mode” of small-scale and temporary bases and globally
deployed fleets. In line with the new maritime strategy, through “regular, temporary operations” such as joint military exercises and provision of humanitarian assistance, the U.S. military can leave behind a small number of important
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military officials and turn places of strategic importance into “semi-permanent”
bases; thus maintaining de facto military presence, still firmly withholding the
U.S. global military strategic network, and implementing strategic encirclement
of different kinds of maritime flashpoints and “potential enemy” through military deployment in “chokepoints” of navigation and strategic nodes. In this way,
[the United States] can not only continue to preserve its military presence in
strategic areas, but also avoid the “tremendous political risk” from maintaining
overseas military bases. [The United States] can thus “kill two birds with one
stone.”
Playing the leading role in the “war against terror.” Because of the navy’s
special characteristics—such as its mobility, which gives it the ability to advance
and withdraw, to deter and fight—naval fleets necessarily receive favorable attention. The exceptional document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, formulated jointly by America’s three maritime forces, demonstrates that
[the Navy] has been placed in an extremely prominent position. In peacetime,
through “forward deployment,” the fleet “places the city under siege” in its deterrent effect. At the outset of war, warships shoot the “first shot” by launching
guided missiles. In the course of war, naval vessels are both weapon launching
platforms and mobile arsenals. At the conclusion of war, they can rapidly leave
the battleground. In the Iraq “War to Overthrow Saddam,” the naval fleet was
thoroughly brought into play with essential functions. In the domains of war
time and space, the Navy has an indispensable role and achieves results that capture the attention of the world and receive “acclaim” from the U.S. authorities
and the military, and it is regarded as an indispensable “trump card” for future
“anti-terrorism” operations.

T R A N S L AT O R ’ S N O T E

The article was originally published in People’s Navy, 27 November 2007, p. 3. The chief editor of
that edition was Wu Chao, the intern editor Yuan Zhenjun.
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